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ABSTRACT
While the politics ofbelonging has a strong tradition in the post-colonial state in
Cameroon, the current wave of democratisation in the 1990s has compelled the Biya
regime to re-conceptualise "belonging". Finding it hard to winfree and fair elections in
the new multiparty system, the Biya government has tried to perpetuate itselfin power by
encouraging the resurgence oflocal identities which wer e likely to support the regime,
notwithstanding thefact that this strategy obviously undermined its professed policy of
national Integration. It has also stretched the conventional idea of minorities to such
ambiguous proportions that historica! minorities like the Anglophones have seen
themselves deniedthe status ofminority in the 1996 constitution, while every small ethnic
grouping which appears to distance itselffrom the Opposition has met with government
support. This paper examines the systematic efforts of the government to deconstruct the
Anglophone identity - an identity which has its historica! foundation in the British
colonisation of the ex-Southern Cameroons and has been reactivated during the current
democratisation process, posing serious problems to the Francophone-dominated state.
One major government strategy has been to fuel the existing tensions between South
Westerners and North Westerners in the Anglophone territory, tensions largely based in
large-scale north-western settlement in the coastal plantation area and in the perceived
domination of the South West by the North West economically and politically since the
end of the 1950s, and to stimulate new alignments like SA WA. The paper argues that the
national government has been quite successful in this endeavour, evidenced by the
decline or inertia of initially powerful political Opposition movements based on
Anglophone alliances.
ANGLOPHONES AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING
When in May 1990 the Anglophones dared to challenge andembarrass the one-party state by launching the SocialDemocratie Front (SDF) in Bamenda, they were, perhaps
without knowing, providing the Biya regime with a more compelling reason
than ever not only to consider Anglophones as "les ennemis dans la
maison", but also and more importantly to intensify strategies for
neutralising Anglophone identity. The fact that the SDF rapidly rose to
prominence and credibility as an Opposition party in Anglophone
Cameroon, coupled with the fact that its slogans and the charisma of its
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leader John Fru Ndi commanded nation-wide appeal, heightened the panic
in government circles and hardened attitudes towards Anglophones and
Anglophone identity. At first, the government did not quite know how te
react nor whom to scapegoat. A study of pro-establishment anonymous
tracts, pamphlets and declarations in the media between 1990 and 1992
shows that initial government attempts to contain the spread of the SDF
and Opposition politics in general, were not well thought out.
While the first government strategy was to lump all Anglophone:
together, and to play up the idea of Anglophone ingratitude to all the stat
had done for them and their region, subsequent reactions sought to apply
divide-and-rule strategy by making a distinction between the supposedly,
conciliatory coastals of the South West Province and the unpatriotic,;
ungrateful, power-monger grassfielders of the North West Province whom
the state identified with their equally troublesome cultural kin - the Bamilek'
of the Francophone Western Province. Thus, the official rhetoric shiftec|
from the collective condemnation of "les Anglo-Bami" to simpl^
condemning "les Bamendo-Bami". Subsequent developments would sho\A
that the government found it increasingly rewarding and politically
expedient to tempt the South West elite away from Anglophone solidaritj
with strategie appointments and the idea that their real enemy was the;
North West elite and not the state or the central administration. Infiltrating:
and hijacking the South West Elite Association (SWELA), therij
subsequently encouraging a merger with the elite association of the native%
Douala to form the Grand SAWA movement, was part of government'|
strategy to weaken Anglophone solidarity through divide and rulr
championed by elite associations (Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998) and the|
politics of the belly (Bayart 1993). j
All of this contributed to the promulgation of the January 1996|
constitution1, which promised protection for minorities at the same time th
the state was clamping down on the activities of the Southern Cameroon
National Council (SCNC), mouthpiece of the critical wing of tb
Angiophone minority. Such double Standards would leave few in doubt a
to why the new constitution was deliberately vague on-the notion
"minority", or the fact that the notion has since been manipulated t
discourage solidarity on the basis of shared interests and predicaments. l
his analysis of similar constitutions elsewhere in colonial and contempora
Africa, Mamdani (1996) has noted that such constitutions limit th
Population not to a civic but to an ethnic space. They also define identity fc
'. For a discussion of IJie various factors contributing to the promulgation of the 1996 constitution, i
Melone et al. 1996.
the populations concerned not by where individuals are born or live, but by
their ethnic ancestral area. Such constitutions thus oblige everyone to
follow the customs of their ethnic group and to emphasise culture, not
rights. Also, by recognising "social identity exclusively through the line of
the father", states with such constitutions, ensure that no degree of inter-
marriage or Integration could ever put together ethnic groups that the state
is determined to have asunder (Mamdani 1998). The Cameroonian state
insists on patriarchal identification by ethnic area, district and province of
origin in national identity cards, birth, marriage and other civic certificates.
lts constitution, like the others, enables ethnic areas to make the distinction
between what Mamdani has termed "ethnic citizens and ethnic strangers".
A point with which Mono Ndjana, one of the most faithful ideologues of the
ruling Cameroon People's Democratie Movement (CPDM), agrees when hè
defines "l'autochtone" as "un citoyen ethnique de l'ethnie locale" and
"l'allogène" as "un citoyen ethnique de l'ethnie d'ailleurs", stressing that in
every African country "chacun est è la fois autochtone et allogène, selon sa
Position dans l'espace" (Mono Ndjana 1997b: 102-103).
The 18 January 1996 constitution (preamble and article 57,
Paragraph 3) states unequivocally that:
The State shall ensure the protection of minorities and shall
preserve the rights of indigenous populations in accordance
with the law.
The Regional Council shall be headed by an indigene of the
Region elected from among its members for the life of the
Council.... The Regional Bureau shall reflect the sociological
components of the Region.
lts timing and release were hardly an accident. The ruling Beti being
a minority ethnic group under threat of losing power in a genuine
democracy, the Anglophones and Bamileke having proved themselves the
most threatening Opposition in the first five years of multipartyism, and the
regime having rejected a "one man one vote" democracy (Mono Ndjana
1997b: 102-103) through repeated riggings, the 1996 constitution was a
foregone conclusion. It would serve the government perfectly in neutralising
both the Anglophone and Bamileke Opposition, while at the same time
diverting attention from failed economie and social policies by scapegoating
grassfielders as ruthless land-grabbing, tax-evading settlers, who were
making it impossible for government to deliver. lts promulgation preceded
the municipal elections that the Opposition SDF party won in some key
urban constituencies, including Douala. The fact that it immediately
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occasioned government-condoned demonstrations by the native Douala,
the SAWA, was even more telling. The pretests led to the creation of the
SAWA2 movement of the coastal peoples, presenting themselves as an
"autochtonous" minority that had suffered political and economie
marginalization from dominant and hegemonie "settlers" or "allogènes"
from the Grassfields (Tatah Mentan 1996; Wang Sonnè 1997; Zognong
1997; Jua 1997; Yenshu 1998; Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998); yet also
playing into the hands of political opportunists keen to stretch their
movement to include groupings as remote from the coast as the Bayang of
Manyu Division. Their aim was to fight exploitation by "unscrupulous" and
"ungrateful" grassfields settlers, and to play up the idea that as minorities,
they needed peace, protection, social order and development. The SAWA!
demonstrated against the Bamileke in particular, who alone accounted for
70 per cent of the Douala population, and who had provided for only one!
indigenous mayor out of the five councils in which the SDF had won the
municipal elections. This was seen as evidence that the Bamileke weref
ready to use their numbers to exclude the indigenous minorities in a1
multiparty context (Wang Sonnè 1997)3. j
In the South West Province, the pro-CPDM governor Oben Peter:
Ashu blamed the settler population, which outnumbered the indigenes iru
most urban areas of the province, for the poor performance of the CPDM in&
some key municipalities, and intensified his crackdown on the SCNC andj
any event organised to celebrate Anglophone identity by scholars and*
activists. A scheduled launching of Francis Nyamnjoh's The Cameroon
GCE Crisis: A Test of Anglophone Solidarity was banned at the last
minute, and the author, Asong Wara (organiser) and Christian Cardinal
Tumi (chief launcher) threatened with detention, for 15 days renewable,
should they proceed despite the ban. Subsequent bannings were brought
to bear on the launching of Charles Taku's For Dame Lynda Chalker &
Other Anglophone Cameroonian Notes, and of Christopher Nsalai's Look
2 "The term Sawa... is generally employed by the L<oüaid 10 reter to themselves as coastal peoples. It
has also been extended to embrace related peoples such as the Bakweri, the Pongo, Malimba,
Dibombari, the Bodiman, the Ewudi (all closely related to the former). Other distant peoples in the
Littoral Province and the South West Province (e.g. the Mbo of the Mungo Division, the Bakossi, the
Bassa of Douala city, the Yabassi, the Bakundu, Balondo, Balong, Mbonge and Bafaw) have also
come to identify themselves with this appellation" (Yenshu 1998).
3 It should be noted that anti-Bamileke sentiments have a long history in the Cameroonian post-1
colonial state. Such anti-Bamileke feelings were even expressed within the Catholic Church. Forf
example, in 1987, Douala priests strongly protested against the appointment of a Bamileke auxiliary
bishop in the Douala Archdiocese. See Collectif Changer Ie Cameroun (C3) 1992. The political;
liberalisation in the early 1990s and the 1996 constitution only helped to exacerbate these sentiments.
Up to the Mountain Top: Beyond Party Politics. Grassfielders in the South l
West Province were likened to scabies, a stubborn skin affliction commonlyl
referred to in Pidgin-English as "Cam-no-go" [meaning an illness thatj
wouldn't be cured or a visitor that wouldn't leave]. In Kumba for example, f
Chief Mukete organised thugs of Bafaw youths to defend the regimej
against the "settler vote" in an election the SDF Opposition was set to win. [
His action would be hailed subsequently by Nerius Nemaso Mbile, an old
and experienced politician, at a joint conference of South West chiefs andj
elites in July 1999, and other traditional leaders urged to emulate him4.
Although its preamble still pays respect to the age-old ideology ofl
nation-building, the constitution appears to place more premium on ethnicl
identities and to allow for an interpretation by government that promisesl
reward to all elite ready to sacrifice the quest for national citizenship orj
power in favour of ethnic citizenship and power. Indeed, from the wayf
politics has been practised since the promulgation of the constitution, itl
would appear that civic identity and inter-ethnic or national constituency, f
are limited to the CPDM president, the only person with a meaningful rightl
to seek power at a central or national level. Challengers who are not l
discouraged by an unfavourable electoral code (Tolen 1997) and the
invidious manipulation of electoral rolls, are eventually vanquished by a
post-ëlection rigging machinery perfected over the years, since 1992. This,
in part, explains howfrom a modest score of 39.976 % in the first multiparty
presidential elections in 1992, Paul Biya would in the 1997 election score
92.57%, reminding one strongly of the one-party era when elections were ä
mere formality for the incumbent and such scores as 99.99%
commonplace. Also, by opting for ten regions along the lines of existing
provinces, the constitution proved the Biya government's committed
disregard for federalism and its determination to keep Anglophones
divided (1996 Constitution, Article 61, paragraph 3), in addition, of course,
to living up to the French-inspired aversion for decentralised government |
among Francophone Cameroonians.
Unsurprisingly, the constitution has been much criticised, especiallyl
by radical Anglophones and the Bamileke. Both the constitution and the
advantage taken by the SAWA of it, have been interpreted differently by
various groups, using media that were either for or against (Tatah Mentan
1996). While the SAWA and the Beti, supported by Cameroon Tribune, Lel
Patriote and L'Anecdote, hailed it as a necessary and timely step to protect
minority groups from the asphyxiating grip of expansionist and dominant
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4 See The Herold, 21 July 1999, pp. l, and 3-4, for a detailed report on the conference which was held)
at the University of Buea on 17 July 1999. .
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migrants such as the Bamileke and groups from the Bamenda Grassfields,
others, articulating their case through the critical anti-government press of
mainly Bamileke and Anglophone origin, saw it as a recipe for national
disintegration (Tatah Mentan 1996; Nkwi and Nyamnjoh 1997; Zognong
1997; Jua 1997). Indeed, since 1996, various groups have taken)
advantage of its ambiguous promise of protection for minorities to fan the|
flames of division and differences with others as a pretext for access t
power and resources at national and regional levels (Konings
Nyamnjoh 1997; Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998; Eyoh 1998a and b;
Nyamnjoh 1999; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh forthcoming). And criticalj
Anglophones have seen in this outcome a trivialization of the notion of "al
minority", and blamed the CPDM government for championing the politics
of divide-and-rule to the detriment of the Anglophone cause and1
nationhood. Some have interpreted the new constitution as a conspiracy by
the state to marginalize the Anglophones even further (Tatah Mentan 1996:
186-194; Jua, 1997), a concern which John Ngu Foncha had already
voiced in his letter of resignation from the CPDM in 1990, when hè wrote
"The Anglophone Cameroonians whom l brought into the union have been I
ridiculed and referred to as "les Biafrais", "les ennemies dans la maison",
"les traïtres", etc., and the constitutional provisions which protected thi
Anglophone minority have been suppressed, their voice drowned ..."5.
The 1996 constitution thus denies the Anglophone claim to minority
status by stressing ethnic purity and indigenous cultural traditions, whilej
downplaying the community's colonial heritage. It re-discovers the colonial
practice of seeing ethnic communities as "permanent crystalline structures"
(Ardener 1967: 297-299), and thus can afford to question the idea of a
Anglophone identity that unites people beyond so-called tribal boundaries.
The constitution has also often been used by the regime and its allies to
endorse the idea of democracy as an ethnic or group right rather than as]
an empowerment of the individual (and the guaranteeing of his/her civiel
rights regardless of ethnic origin) as stipulated in its preamble. For, as|
Mono Ndjana, the CPDM ideologue argues, every ethnic group is entitledj
to "sa place au soleil, sans chercher a öter les autres du même soleil"
(Mono Ndjana 1997b: 103). This view effectively denies the idea of aj
Cameroonian citizenship, since even metropolitan areas like Douala and]
Yaoundé, created by colonialists and cosmopolitan from the outset, have]
under the new constitution been claimed by this or that autochtonous groupj
to a degree quite unprecedented. Little wonder therefore, that thes
5 Dr J.N. Foncha's Letter of Resignation from the C.P.D.M., reproduced in Mukong 1990: 155.
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ippointment of Andre Wouking, a Bamileke, as Archbishop of Yaounde in
uly 1999 (to succeed Jean Zoa, a Beti, who died in 1998), should be
reeted with Indignation by Beti elite, clergy and Christians, at the same
:ime that it was hailed by the Bamileke press as a good lesson in national
Integration by the Pope to President Biya, champion of the rhetoric of
national Integration6.
To those who sought protection as minorities, the price to pay
would increasingly be stated in no uncertain terms: Vote the CPDM, the
only party, according to Mono Ndjana (1997b: 96), with "une assise assez |
importante ou un pouvoir d'attraction süffisant". Which is exactly what the
Prime Minister, Peter Mafany Musonge, himself a SAWA, told SAWA chiefs
at a meeting in Kumba on 8 March 1997. In fact, since his appointment in
September 1996, Musonge and the pro-CPDM SWELA and SAWA elite
have constantly admonished the coastal people to throw their weightl
behind President Biya and the CPDM. As Musonge put it during a
reception in Buea following his appointment, "President Biya has scratched
our back, and we shall certainly scratch the Head of State's back
thoroughly when time comes", meaning that the SAWA should, together
with him, resolve to manifest their total support and allegiance to the
President who appointed him7. A promise they were shown to have kept at
the 1997 presidential elections, after which Biya would again reward him
with a re-appointment as PM. The fact that political parties created by
SAWA indigenes at the beginning of the 1990s had all failed to take root by
19968, meant that SAWA Opposition politicians who had failed to make it at
a national level through party politics found in the SAWA movement a
Singular opportunity to stage a political comeback. In his paper on this
movement, Wang Sonnè (1997: 187-195) draws attention to the example
6 See Cameroon Tribune, 19 July 1999, pp.8-9, for reactions to the appointment titled: "Yaoundé: l
l'archevêque qu'on n'attendait pas"; and La Nouvelle Expression, 21 July 1999, p.6, for the articlel
"Archidiocèse de Yaoundé: déja des cloches dissonnantes". In an interview with the Editor-in-Chief of j
Cameroon Tribune, Paul C. Ndembiyembe (a Beti), Andre Wouking expressed shock and Indignation F
over the behaviour of a Beti priest who refused to say mass at the Yaoundé Cathedral, on 18 July l
1999. "to mark his disapproval" of the appointment of a Bamileke as archbishop of a "Beti" diocese. |
See Cameroon Tribune, 23 July 1999, pp.8-10.
7 See Cameroon Post, 12-18 November 1996, pp. l and 3; The Herald, 11-12 November 1996, pp. 11
and 3; The Star Headlines, 20 November 1996, pp.l-7. For a critical commentary on the "politics of
back-scratching" which former PM Simon Achidi Achu and his successor PM Peter Mafany Musonge l
sought to promote in their regions and elsewhere in appreciation of appointments by Biya, see Rotcodl
Gobata in Cameroon Post, 26 November - 2 December 1996, p.7.
8. Examples include Yondo Black's Mouvement Social pour la Nouvelle Democratie (MSND), Jean-1
Jacques Ekindi's Mouvement Progressiste (MP), Mola Njoh Litumbe's Liberal Democratie Alliance|
(LDA) and Samuel Eboua's Mouvement pour la Democratie Populaire (MDP).
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of Jean-Jacques Ekindi of the Mouvement Progressiste (MP), who, after 4
l years in political wilderness, enthusiastically accepted to coordinate the
; SAWA movement, supported by the very CPDM from which hè had
1 resigned in 1991 and the leader of which hè had challenged resolutely at
| the October 1992 presidential elections. This perspective by no means
; denies the SAWA movement a cultural content or legitimacy, but it draws
i l attention to how a political elite could seek to manipulate a cultural
i; movement for political ends. For more on elite associations and politics in
Cameroon, see Nyamnjoh and Rowlands (1998).
'1
l CONTAINING ANGLOPHONE IDENTITY IN CAMEROON
i The 1996 constitution and the politics of belonging in the 1990s
might have.institutionalised and intensified the sense of divisions among
Anglophones, but this by no means implies that the Machiavellian designs
of the Francophone-dominated state for asphyxiating Anglophone identity
started then. Indeed, the manipulation of ethnic and regional rivalries to
divide and rule the Anglophones, among others, is a long-standing strategy
in national politics (Bayart 1979). As we have argued elsewhere (Konings
and Nyamnjoh 1997), contrary to Anglophone expectations upon re-
unification, federalism, far from providing for equal partnership between
Anglophones and Francophones and guaranteeing cultural continuity for
the former, turned out to be nothing more than a comma in a long sentence
of assimilation of the Anglophone minority (see also Benjamin 1972).
Gradually, the poignant sense of cultural erosion and devaluation of most
things Anglophone this brought about, resulted in an Anglophone
consciousness with every potential for crystallising into a grand
Anglophone ethnie. The feeling of being "marginalised", "exploited", and
"assimilated" by the Francophone-dominated state and even by the
Francophone population as a whole, has inspired novelists, playwrights,
poets, musicians, journalists, academies, the clergy and the entire
Anglophone Community (Nyamnjoh 1996a; Lyonga et al. 1993). Most
Anglophones, like their outspoken Archbishop Paul Verdzekov of
Bamenda, are acutely aware of the active pursuit by the state, of "an
jnwritten policy of absorption and assimilation" of Anglophones. They have
a deep feeling that their only chance of being accepted as bona fide
Dameroonians seems to rest with their total Frenchification or
rancophonisation9. A feeling which is lent added credence by arrogant
teclarations now and again by Francophones in high office. In one such
See Paul Verdzekov, Archbishop of Bamenda, A Talk ai the Präsentation ofa Book Entitled: The
^ameroon GCE Crisis: A Test of Anglophone Solidarity, Monday, l July 1996.
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~jlaration, the former Vice-Prime Minister in-charge of Housing and Town
Panning, Hamadou Mustapha, said: "A un moment donné effectivement,
a commencé è oublier que les Anglophones étaient Ie; on a eu
.ipression que les Anglophones s'étaient déjè francophonisés"10. It is
irdly surprising, therefore, that the government, in its Interpretation of a
Institution purportedly protective of minorities, should not provide for an
iglophone minority.
In an earlier article on the Anglophone problem (Konings and
Jyamnjoh 1997), we discussed at length some of the strategies employed
yy successive Francophone-dominated governments since independence
|o marginalise Anglophones and weaken or deny them a sense of identity.
" torn the outset, Ahidjo, Cameroon's first president, was never enthusiastic
tbout federalism as a lasting solution to the bi-cultural colonial heritage of
ie country. He saw federalism merely as an unavoidable transit on a
lumey to the total assimilation of the Anglophone minority into a strongly
mtralised state é la frangaise. To achieve this objective, hè employed
.jveral tactics which included: playing Anglophone political factions off
igainst each other and eventually uniting them into a single party, the
Jameroon National Union (CNU) created in September 1966; dis-
ippointing from positions of responsibility key Anglophones committed to
»federalism in favour of those amenable to the unitary state; creating
i'clients" through granting top posts in the federal institutions and in the
single party to representatives of significant ethnic and regional groups in
:he Anglophone region; and resorting to overt repression of dissent.
Through these and other tactics he succeeded in abolishing the federation
in favour of the unitary state, which hè achieved through his "glorious
svolution of 20 May 1972". To reduce further the danger of any united
»nglophone action against the unitary state, Ahidjo decided to divide the
jrstwhile Federated State of West Cameroon into the South West and
North West Provinces. This decision, masterfully informed by the interna!
intradictions within the Anglophone community between the coastal/forest
lople (the South West Province) and the grassfields people (the North
/est Province), would exarcebate those divisions which in future would
ierve as the Achilles' heel of most attempts at Anglophone solidarity.
> Upon succeeding Ahidjo, Biya proved he was just as keen in
fobliterating Anglophone identity and in zombifying the Anglophone elite, as
Ithe former was. His government has thus employed similar strategies
i(perfecting some and adding new ones) in containing the Anglophones and
[their identity. The so-called Bamenda Proclamation, adopted by the
10 See Jeune Afrique Economie, No.207, 20 November 1995, p.63.
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Second All Anglophone Conference (AACII) held at Bamenda from 29 Api
to 1 May 1994, mentions some of the most important strategies used.
says that "rather than address the issue", the Biya government h
preferred "to feign ignorance of the Anglophone problem... to seek
diverse manoeuvres to create division within the Anglophone nation witl
the aim of giving the false impression that there is no general consensui
within it on constitutional reform... and to accuse the All Anglophon
Conference and its affiliated organisations unjustly and falsely of havin
adopted a secession of Anglophone Cameroon as their goal".
The Biya government has often tried to trivialise the Anglophone]
Francophone divide, preferring to stress a common colonial identity und<
Germany, and the idea of national integration which the 1972 revolutior'
invented. Meaningful though this argument would be to any country with
clear sense of vision, it fails, in the Cameroonian context, to convince th<
Anglophone minority, by coming short, in practice, of institutionalisin
, mechanisms for weakening the strong grip on the state by Francophone:
, and their French colonial heritage. At present, Cameroon claims to be
bilingual and multi-cultural state, which is said to be a safe guarantee foi
, the preservation of the differential linguistic and cultural heritage of th
( post-German colonial era. In practice, the experiences of ordina
l Anglophones belie such claims, especially as little is done to disguise th
, superiority accorded the French language and Francophone cultural value
i over everything Anglophone or English.
l In reply to the Anglophone demand for a return to the federal stati
, as the best guarantee of their identity, the Biya government has oftei
( stressed that the unitary state was the result of a massive vote of th
Cameroonian people voluntarily expressed during the 1972 referendum.)
l Like Ahidjo, Biya has tabled arguments in favour of the present)
i dispensation, and has rejected federalism as costly, weakening to statej
i power, and divisive; even if his politics of belonging does not appear to bel
i any less divisive or costly. Declining to discuss a possible return to|
[federalism which hè sees as a ploy by radical Anglophones to obtainl
secession for their area, Biya (with the support of most Francophone elitei
: and media, regardless of political persuasion) has conceded to a certain
: degree of decentralisation within the unitary state, the so-called ten-region
: option based on the present ten provinces in Cameroon (1996 constitution,
article 61, paragraph 1)11.
In an interview granted to Jeune Afrique Economie in 1999, Biya indicated his willingness toj
organise a referendum on the Anglophone problem "if the need is there", stressing that only a small!
minority of the Anglophones were clamoring for secession. For a summary of this interview, seei
Like his predecessor, Biya has attempted, with significant succes
divide the Anglophones, often capitalising on existing contradictior
Jtween the North West and South West elite. One of his divisive tactic
js been to appoint South Westerners to key positions in the South Wes
response to South Westerners' complaints about North West dominatic
/er their province (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997; Eyoh 1998a and b). Bi>
js also sought to use his Anglophone allies for the defence of the unitai
täte in exchange for rewards in the form of appointments, sinecures and
lind eye to corruption and/or embezzlement by those in high office. And i
irn, the allies have tended to blame the leaders of various Anglophon
lovements for their "demagogie and irresponsible" calls for federalism <
xession, and to dispute their claims of being "spokesmen" of th
Anglophone community, blaming them, as did Prime Minister Peter Mafan
lusonge in November 1996, for leading "hostile campaigns at home an
>road to foster division and hatred" among Cameroonians12. They equall
riallenge claims of Anglophone marginalisation, preferring to talk instea
jf "self-marginalisation", and to invite Anglophones to consider themselve
is fully fledged Cameroonians with the same rights and responsibilities a
•rancophones (Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998: 335). This has often led t
(vere confrontations between the two camps and to mutual accusations c
.jtrayal. But to most ordinary Anglophones, it is simply hard to fathor
tow, just for a few appointments and sinecures, their elite are all too eage
serve as gatekeepers and scavengers for a government that denie
lern an identity and disrecognises their predicaments as a communit
[Myamnjoh 1999). More and more the youths are quite critica! of those elifc
fho spend their active years in the service of fear and repression, just t
irn around upon retirement to seek fame through "dubious" identificatioi
rith the Anglophone cause.
i'a Boh Cameroon -Bulletin No.417. Contrary to Biya's view, we showed in an earlier articl
Conings and Nyamnjoh 1997) that the Anglophone problem can no longer be perceived as an eliti:
oblem This can be substantiated by the widespread support for a number of actions organise
ainst the Francophone-dominated state by the various Anglophone movements. This wa
ticularly manifest during the "sensitisation tour" orgamsed by the SCNC throughout th
Jnglophone territory in July-August 1995 following the return of its delegation to the United Nation«
(arge crowds artended the SCNC rallies, praising the delegation for its historie mission to the Unitei
fations and pledging their support for the SCNC's new strive for total independence of the Southen
ameroons. When security forces tried to prevent the SCNC delegation from entering Kumba in th
puth West Province, thousands of people chased them away, thus securing a triumphant entry of th
elegation into the town. For these SCNC rallies, see "SCNC Hits Kumba: 75000 jam town green", ii
Herald, 3-6 August 1994, p.l, and "As Elites Condemn Military Operation: SCNC plan
peration storm Mamfe", in Cameroon Post, 14-21 August 1995.
'• See The Herald, 2-3 December 1996, p. l .
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Following the Organisation of the All Anglophone Conference (AAC
on 2-3 April 1993, there were attempts by certain representatives of th
South West Chiefs Conference and of the South West Elite Associatie
(SWELA), who were known to be closely allied with the regime in power, t
the AAC and from the Buea Declaration. There was also a meeting of
previously little-known North West Cultural and Development Associatie
(NOCUDA) at Bamenda on 14 May 1993 to dissociate the North Wes
Province from the AAC, branding it a South West affair. This meetin
seems to have been organised by North Western members of the CPDIV
who again, in 1994, would actively work against the holding of AACII
Bamenda, in a bid "to kill the Anglophone dream"13.
On 23 September 1993, nine representatives of the South We
Chiefs Conference undertook a mission to Yaoundé to pledge thei
unalloyed allegiance to President Biya. They told him that "they we
alarmed at the numerous demonstrations, blackmail, civil disobedience
rebellious attitudes and recurrent activities designed to destabilise the stati
and the government". They strongly condemned any attempts
partitioning Cameroon on the basis of Anglophone and Francophoni
cultures. They asked the Head of State to transform the present tei
17
ction of SWELA, with Martin Nkemngu of Lebialem Division as Secretary
eneral, was more critical of government policies and often allied to
>position parties, principally the SDP, an "active member" of which Martin
kemngu declared hè was15. It advocated closer co-operation between the
l .. (Houtn West and Nortn West elite as a necessary precondition for an
rm în°n!!f Hfective representation of Anglophone interests. It strongly supported the
nglophone demand for a return to the federal state - a stance heavily
provinces into ten autonomous regions. At the end of the meeting, thej |ifferences between the
drew his attention to the fact that the South West Provmce had beef
discriminated against after reunjfication in the distribution of "strategii
posts"/"
Following the military brutalities in the South West during the 199!
government anti-smuggling campaign, a split occurred in the South Wes
Elite Association (SWELA) founded in 1991 to promote the socio-economi(
and cultural development of the South West Province and combat Nortl
West domination over the South West. The split gave birth to a pro-CPDI\
faction keen on maintaining close links with the Biya regime and oi
showing strong anti-North West sentiments. The group was composed o
older and younger CPDM barons, and opposed to a return to the federa
state. Liké the CPDM government, it championed the ten-state option
North West Provinces and thus safeguard South West autonomy. Anothei
13 See Cameroon Post, 20-27 April 1994, pp. 2-3; Cameroon Post (Special), 29 April - l May 1994
pp. 1-12; Cameroon Post, 29 June - 6 July 1994, pp.6-7; The Herald, 29 April - l May 1994, pp.1-2
Cameroon Post, 29 June - 6 July 1994, pp.6-7; The Messenger. 2 May 1994, pp. l and 2.
14 The Herald, 3-10 November 1993, p.6.
riticised by the pro-CPDM faction which saw Nkemngu and the entire
toialem Division as grassfielders and therefore North Westerners in
sguise. But to show how powerful the pro-CPDM SWELA was, its
ecretary-General, Gaven Nnoko Mbele, was appointed Government
elegate for the Kumba Urban Council following the January 1996
unicipal elections, while Martin Nkemngu, Secretary-General of the pro-
CNC SWELA, was transferred from Buea where hè was provincial chief
r CAMNEWS, to Yaoundé as an ordinary staff of the official publisher,
50PECAM.
Since 1994, a number of southwestern and northwestern chiefs and
nembers of the CPDM have repeatedly condemned the call for an
idependent Southern Cameroons state, appealing to the Head of State to
imploy every available means to defend the unitary state (Konings
999b). Current Obsession with autochtony as well as the acute sense of
provinces since the appointment of Musonge
Fons to create aJs
H
ociations of their Ownis PM, have pushed North
o lobby for power and resources for their province16. Similarly, in May
999, Peter Abety, Minister for Special Duties at the Presidency, launched,
ülmost single-handedly, a North West Development Association
NOWEDA) which is yet to prove itself in any way.
Paradoxically, the "Anglophone problem" has enhanced the
jhances of the Biya loyalists among the Anglophone elite to be appointed
D government posts which used to be reserved for Francophones only.
L See Cameroon Post, 29 October - 4 November 1996, pp. l and 9.
'. Quite typical of the politics of division particularly characteristic of the 1990s in Cameroon, there
which would retain the.present Separation between the South West are K two factions of the Fons'conference: The North west Fons' Union (NOWEFU) led by Fon
^ iwmbi II of Bafut, and the North West Fons' Conference (NOWEFCO) led by Fon Doh Gah
Swanyin of Balikumbat, the lone CPDM parliamentarian of the province. The latter is said to have
lanipulated members of government and the Governor into thinking that his faction was more
opular, thus straining relations between Governor Kouambo Adrien and NOWEFU. However,
resident Biya and Prime Minister Musonge apparently endorsed NOWEFU when they both sent
epresentatives with messages of encouragement to the NOWEFU general assembly that met on 5
une 1999 in Bamenda. A development which Fon Doh did not appreciate. See The Herald, 16 May
999, pp. 1-2; 7 June 1999, pp.1-2; and 11 June 1999, p.2.
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Obviously, Biya's decision to enhance the position of Anglophones in th
state apparatus, is a strategy to belie Anglophone charges tha
Anglophones only play second-fiddle in the Francophone-dominate
unitary state and, simultaneously, to attract new members of th
Anglophone elite into the "hegemonie alliance" (Bayart 1979). In 1992 th
North Westerner, Simon Achidi Achu, and the South Westerner, Ephrain
Inoni were appointed respectively Prime Minister and Deputy-Secretar
General at the Presidency of the Republic. They, and other highly place
Anglophones, tend to be members of the Anglophone delegations whic
are regularly sent by Biya from Yaoundé to the Anglophone provinces t
contest the claims of the leadership of the Anglophone movements and t
defend the unitary state. It should, however, be noted that Biya's new polic
of allocating prestigious positions within the state apparatus to hi
Anglophone allies, has also encouraged internal competition among thes
privileged allies, particularly between South Westerners and Mort
Westerners (Nyamnjoh 1999). Compared to the Nórth Westerners, Sout
Westerners have feit under-represented in the highest government office
and have always maintained that South Westerners replace Mort
Westerners in the choicest jobs17. So when Peter Mafany Musonge wa
appointed in September 1996 to take over from Simon Achidi Achu as Pl\i
and more South Westerners maintained in key cabinet positions than Nortl
Westerners, "the South West people ... went wild with excitement am
jubilation and loudly praised the Head of State", for having at last listenet
to the cry of despair of South Westerners, who for over thirty-six years
were "confined to the periphery of national politics and socio-economi
development"18. In the words of Musonge himself, this being "the first timi
in our history as a united nation that a South Westerner has beei
appointed prime minister", South Westerners had to "come together ti
galvanise the second political awakening in the South West Province", am
17 For example, following the January 1996 municipal elections which, according to official result
Prime Minister Achidi Achu (North Westerner) lost at his home constituency of Santa, while Minist«
of Higher Education Peter Agbor Tabi (South Westerner) won in Mamfe, the latter did not conceal
ambition to take over from Achidi Achu as Prime Minister. See The Herald, 1-3 April 1996, pp. l an
3; and 11-14 April 1996, pp.l and 2; Weeldy Post, 5-11 June 1996, pp. l and 4. In March 1996, th
southwestern political analyst and journalist, Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, not only predicted that th
next Prime Minister would be Anglophone and South Westerner, but even had the prescience to nam
Peter Mafany Musonge as the most likely successor: "like Achidi Achu who left Bamenda to becom
Prime Minister, Musonge could also leave Limbe to the Star House". SeeCameroon Post, 24-3
September 1996, pp. l and 3.
18 See "Significance of P.M. Musonge's Appointment" by a South West elite, Kome Epule, in The Sh
Headlines, 20 November 1996, p.5.
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"strengthen our position and bargaining power". At his CPDM congress
December 1996, Paul Biya further strengthened the position of the South
esterners when hè admitted more of them into the Central Committee of
j party than hè did North Westerners; and the 22-member Political
ireau formed after the congress included two South Westerners (John
tong Ngolle and Dr Mrs Dorothy Njeuma) and one North Westerner only
amfu Samuel Ngeh). These developments were interpreted by North
est CDPM barons as an indictment of them by the head of state, for
Irng to contain the SDF and radical Anglophones amongst them. The
bsequent creation of a North West Development Association (NOWEDA)
Peter Abety and of the North West Fons' Union (NOWEFU) and North
est Föns' Conference (NOWEFCO), would be interpreted as an attempt
these barons to get their act together, and begin retrieving lost
vantages.
Pro-CPDM South West elite have exploited the massive labour
gration from the North West to their province where a plantation
onomy was established during the German colonial era (Konings 1993;
98), to amplify the differences between the two provinces. Increasingly,
ey have tended to accuse the large-scale "settler population" of North
est origin, of exploitation, land-grabbing and ingratitude to welcoming
digenes. They have not hesitated using the settler presence to explain all
litical disturbances in the South West Province, even going as far as insi-
ating that poor performance at elections by thé ruling CPDM and
cessionist tendencies among Anglophones could be attributed wholly to
"settler" Opposition and dissidente. Hence, Fon Njifua of Fontem's
claration at the joint conference of South West Chiefs and Elites in Buea,
iy 1999, that no true South Westerner "sympathises" with the SCNC,
en though Ndoki Mukete, a South Westerner and SCNC chairman, was
the hall19.
The Biya government, like Ahidjo's, has also relied on a strategy of
Dression. Lack of unity and severe repression precluded the Anglophone
te from openly expressing its grievances about Francophone domination
til 1982, when Biya took power. In the wake of his introduction of a
degree of liberalisation, the Anglophone elite began voicing its long-
»nding grievances. In 1983, the Biya government issued an Order
Jdifying the Anglophone General Certificate of Education (GCE)
amination by making it a group certificate similar to the Baccalauréat,
rtead of the single-subject examination that it was. The publication of this
•der sparked off an Anglophone studente' boycott of classes and
X.The Herald, 21 July 1999, p.3.




demonstrations brutally repressed by the police at Yaoundé University ar
in the urban centres in Anglophone Cameroon (Nyamnjoh 1996<
informed or not by student protests elsewhere on the continent. In Februa
1984, the Biya government changed the official name of the country
the "United Republic of Cameroon" to simply the "Republic of Cameroon'
despite vehement Anglophone protests that this was the name of ind
pendent Francophone Cameroon prior to reunification. The new nan
appeared to deny that the Cameroon state was composed of two distin
identities. Biya argued that the name change was not only a demonstratii
of the political maturity of the Cameroonian people after almost twenty-fh
years of independence, but also a sign that the people had
overcome divisions caused by seventy years of European colonisatk
(Biya 1987: 6). In Anglophone circles, however, Biya's unilateral nan
change seems to have given rise to two different interpretations. Son
Anglophones consider this action as the boldest step yet taken toward
assimilation and disappearance as a distinct founding community.
fina tglophones
th( snks
them, the new name was clear evidence that, as far as Biya w,
concerned, the Anglophone territory and people had lost their identity at
had become an indistinguishable part of the former Republic of Cameroo
thus carrying out to its intended conclusion Ahidjo's designs to absorb
assimilate the Anglophone minority into the Francophone-dominated stal
Other Anglophones argued that by this action La République du Cameroi
20 had unilaterally seceded from the union and thus lacks a constitution
base to continue ruling the former Southern Cameroons. They are oftf
inclined to appeal to the United Nations to assist its former Trust Territory
peacefully separating from La République. This view was first expressed
the eminent Anglophone lawyer and first president of the Cameroon
Association, Fon Gorji Dinka. On 20 March 1985, Dinka addressed
memorandum to Paul Biya entitled "The New Social Order". In tl
memorandum, hè declared the Biya government to be unconstitutional ai
called for the Southern Cameroons to become independent and to
rebaptized as the Republic of Ambazonia. Dinka was arrested ar|
imprisoned without trial until January 1986, which transformed him into
Anglophone martyr21. In the same year at the same time (i.e. during
20 Reference to the incumbent regime as the government of La République du Cameroun, the nai
adopted by Francophone Cameroon at independence, has become a key signifler in the replotting
the nation's constitutional history as a progressive consolidation of the recolonisation of Anglopho
Cameroon by the post-colonial Francophone-dominated state. See Eyoh 1998b: 264.
21 See Fon Gorji Dinka's The New Social Order, dated 20 March 1985, addressed to H.E. Comrade
Biya at the Bamenda CNU party congress (mimeo).
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inenda Congress of the single party), two memoranda were submitted to
participants by members of the North West and South West elite
frdfeident in Douala. These documents drew the attention of the participants
the Anglophone plight and highlighted that the Anglophone elite feit
telined from political power22.
In 1993, the Biya government, through the Vice Chancellor of the
liversity of Buea, Dr Mrs Dorothy Njeuma, did not allow the convenors to
ld the AACI on the premises of the University of Buea. In 1994, it
empted to obstruct the Organisation of AACI l, using the idea that
had come "together in Bamenda to declare secession" as an
cuse for repression. Leaders of the Anglophone movements tend to be
rassed by security forces, threatened with arrest, and subjected to
velling restrictions, although such state repression is not always effective
to sabotage and tip-offs by some servants of the regime
mpathetic to the Anglophone cause. In general, repression has
tfeased with mounting threats of the proclamation of an independent
tithern Cameroons state. SCNC rallies and demonstrations are officially
nned in the Anglophone provinces. Repression was particularly severe in
aflE) aftermath of an attack of the Southern Cameroons Youth League
CYL) on some military and civil establishments in the Bui and Mezam
visions of the North. West Province on 27-28 March 1997.
The SCYL emerged in the mid-1990s as one of the many
iglophone associations that operated under the umbrella of the SCNC.
»ing composed of "young people who do not see any future for
smselves and who would prefer to die fighting than continue to submit to
B p fate imposed on Southern Cameroons by La République"23, the SCYL
ïied at becoming the militant wing of the SCNC. lts original leadership
is largely made up of Anglophone members of the former University of
oundé students' union, the so-called 'Parlement', which was engaged in
Iferal violent confrontations with the university authorities and the Biya
vernment during the period 1990-199624. The SCYL became soon
ssatisfied with the SCNC whose leadership continued to adhere to a
ategy of peaceful dialogue with the Francophone-dominated state for
her a return to a federal state or outright secession, manifest in its motto:
hese documents can be found in Mukong 1990.
ee Mr Fidelis Chiabi, chairman of the former Anglophone Youth Council, in Cameroon Post, 1-2
ruary 1994, p.7.
Or the "parlement" at the University of Yaoundé, see, for instance, A.D. Lisinge, The Philosophy
*iehind University Crisis (no date and publisher indicated).










"the force of argument" - nothwithstanding the Biya government's persiste
refusal to enter into negotiations with the SCNC and its veheme
repression of SCNC activities. The SCYL leadership cut its relationship wi
the SCNC in November 1996 and placed itself under the umbrella of
newly established Southern Cameroons Independence Restoration Coun
state through armed rebellion, manifest in its motto: "the argument
force". Still in the process of preparing for action in both Anglophoi
provinces, it was unexpectedly faced with the detention of its chairman,
Akwanga Ebenezer Mbongo, following his attempted theft of explosi
from the Razel Company at Jakiri in the night of 23-24 March
immediately reacted by attacking some military and civil establishments
the North West Province on 27-28 March 1997. According to offi
reports, three gendarmes and seven unidentified assailants were killed
these operations. Government repression of this ill-planned revolt was
of proportion. It ruthlessly killed, tortured, raped and arrested several
men and women, forcing even more of them to go into exile. Above all,
seized the opportunity to clamp down on the SDF and SCNC, accusii
both organisatiohs of being responsible for the uprising25. A considera
number of SCNC members were arrested and imprisoned in Yaoun
Since the uprising, the government has regularly accused the SCNC
importing weapons and inciting the Anglophone population to arm
rebellion. On 29 December 1999, Southern Cameroons "independe
fighters" captured the radio station at Buea and broadcast a recon
message, read by Justice Fred Ebong, who has been closely connecti
with the SOYL, proclaiming the independence of the Southern Camerooi
On 7 January 2000, they hoisted the United Nations and Federation fla
in Victoria (Limbe). Justice Ebong and other "suspects" were subsequen
detained and political activities were proscribed in the South Wf
Province26. In March 2000, Justice Ebong, still in prison, was elect
chairman of the SCNC.
MASS MEDIA AND ANGLOPHONE DISEMPOWERMENT
One of the Instruments which the Francophone-dominated state
relied on to implement their various strategies for disempowering
(lophones in Cameroon, has been the media. By seeking total
lership and control of the broadcast media while using draconian laws
stifle the private press, the state has, over the years, stunted
(SCIRC). It now aimed at creating an independent Southern Cameroo llophone freedom, weakened solidarity among Anglophones, and dealt
- sense of identity a crippling blow. Government media policies and
:ices and how they affected the Anglophones prior to 1990 have been
documented (cf. Nyamnjoh 1989; and 1990); so also has the
jicularly difficult legal environment wherein the private press has
d since 1990 (cf. Nyamnjoh 1996b and c). In this section therefore,
focus on how the government has employed the state media -
Icasting especially, to deny Anglophone identity and solidarity, while
encouraging the rise and proliferation of ethnic and regional print
ia.
25 In a report that was füll of factual errors and based on spurious evidence, Jeune Afrique Econoi '")' "Ut here are 3 few
supported the Biya government's allegation that the SCNC was responsible for the revolt. See Jet
Afrique Economie, No.239, 14 April 1997, p.8. The journal's support of the Biya governmei
allegation is not altogether surprising. Titus Edzoa, a former Secretary-General at the Presidency, 01
revealed that the Journal was used for public relations purposes by the regime. To this end, the regi
had funded the Journal to the tune of FCFA 1.5 billion (or US $ 3 million).
26 This account is based on various SCYL reports and our interviews with some SCYL leaders.
CAMEROON RADIO AND TELEV1SION (CRTV) AND ANGLOPHONE IDENTTTY
With the launching of the SDF in 1990, the Anglophone journalists
ie official media, in general, tended to distance themselves from the
of pro-establishment journalism defined by government and largely
n for granted by their Francophone colleagues. The history of
ilence in the official media was principally the history of government's
iptto streamline the Anglophone journalists.. The launching of the SDF
to much witch-hunting against the Anglophone journalists in CRTV,
im management identified with the new ("illegal") party. The witch-hunt
quite understandable, for while Zacharie Ngniman, Antoine-Marie
no and other Francophone journalists presented the unsigned and
ated communiqué from Minister Henri Bandoio as if this were verified
mation, Julius Wamey, on his part, insisted that his broadcast was the
irnment's version of events in Bamenda. Relations between CRTV
orities and critical Anglophone journalists only grew worse following the
utionalization of multipartyism, leading to claims in the private press of
'anti-Anglophone campaign" mounted by government and CRTV
agement. Much of this has been well documented (cf. Nyamnjoh
Cameroon Post2? reports on a meeting the Minister of Information
Culture held, the first week of June 1991, with CRTV journalists, during
h th« «i««*« »j—.i.;*..,» -. Engüsh language programmes of
ieroon Post, 6-13 June 1991, p. I
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being sympathetic to the Opposition. Specifically cited were "Luncl
Date" - later on modified drastically by order of the minister, "News Fo
the 7.30 p.m. news and "Cameroon Calling" from which Anembom M
Wain Paul Ngam, Asonglefac Nkemleke and Julius Wamey
subsequently suspended. The minister also attacked TV News Editc
Chief Eric Chinje "for reporting the resignation of CPDM Wouri Sei
President Jean Jacques Ekindi without announcing the non-resignatie
Mifi Section President Joseph K. Tanyi". The minister implied that this
part of the Anglophone journalists' attempts to sabotage the C
government. The suspensions were interpreted by the journalists as
of a campaign launched by the Information and Culture Minister and C
General Manager Mendo Ze to stop the tide of Anglophone journa
objectivity on CRTV". The minister insisted on the necessity of Cl
journalists to respect the corporation's editorial policy, a euphemisi
asking all journalists to see things the government's way. Julius Wi
was accused of having "falsely" clairried during a CRTV news flash thi,,
South West Chiefs meeting in Kumba had called for a national conferei
and that students marching in Bamenda had done same. The goverm
the North West Province, in a telex to MINAT, was reported to
wondered "why government media organs are being used by journ
who are partisan to the SDF".
In a "confidential" letter to the General Manager of CRTV,
Minister Sadou Hayatou was said28 to have called for severe sanu
against Anglophone journalists who were using the official media to
government". The Prime Minister was reported to have accused, ar
others, "Cameroon Calling" and the English news of having "more
more exhibited reckless abandon ... in their analysis which have of
seemed like an arraignment of government action". In his lett<
complained that "newscasters on radio and television have tendt
express their personal standpoints as if they were those of governmi
He concluded by instructing the General Manager to "verify this situ
and where necessary address a severe warning to such personnel
should not turn a public service into a private media with a tendei
teleguide government action".
While some Anglophone journalists in the public media,
disillusionment notwithstanding, identified with the PR role expectt
them by government, others opted either to leave the system entirely
Boh Herbert, Charlie Ndichia, Eric Chinje, Victor Epie Ngome, Oi
Bama, Larry Eyong-Echaw, Ben Bongang and Julius Wamey),
2S. See Cameroon Post, 30 July - 6 August 1991, p.3.
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ance themselves from official rhetoric whenever they could (e.g. Ebssiy
urn, Wain Paul Ngam and Asonglefac Nkemleke). According to The
<sporan 29, of the nearly 50 reporters and announcers who starled or
television in its first three years of existence, 27 (of whom 21
jlophones) had, by April 1994, "departed in bitterness and
lusionment to seek better climes". Those who opted for government PR
ïialism, claimed that all the government and its acolytes did was well
in the best interest of Anglophones and Cameroon in general, and that
radical Opposition, the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) and the
neroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) were void of true patriots and
jtivated only by selfish, regional, or tribal self-interests. These, CRTV
hagement would encourage with appointments to key positions, and
|ntually, the impression would be created that the critical journalists were
fn the North West Province while their pro-establishment counterparts
from the South West Province. Selective appointment of South West
lalists to strategie positions would further drive this message home.
However, the critical journalists were convinced that the radical
sition and extremist pressure groups they supported stood for "the
i" and the best interest of Anglophones and of Cameroon, and that the
ernment and its acolytes were dissemblers motivated by selfish
ïitions, the greed for power and other selfish pursuits. Many
phone journalists in CRTV who rapidly distanced themselves from
role as government spokesmen or mouthpieces following the
hing of the SDF, thus rechanneled their energies in the service of the
jinalized Anglophone community. But using the official media to
sulate societal problems and aspirations met with stiff resistance from
authorities (Nyamnjoh 1996b).
In general, Anglophones feel CRTV does not cater for their
ssts. According to Philip Ndi30, this is because "there is nobody who
3lly represents the Anglophones at CRTV", and "decisions are taken
larily and nobody raises an eyebrow". He argues that "many decisions
en not only to frustrate Anglophone journalists but to minimise and
adit their efforts".
As an institution, CRTV has seldom been comfortable reporting the
^about any Anglophone movement, initiative or programme of action.
iThe Diasporan, 14 April 1995, which devotes its front and central pages to television in
bon, "a revolution that ate its children". The articles or testimonies are by Eric Chinje, Julius
y, Melissa Nambangi and Orlando Bama, all of whom are former CRTV journalists living
'studying in the USA. The Diasporan is US-based and has as Editor-in-Chief Julius Wamey.
'Herold, 13-20 January 1993, p.4.
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An example of CRTV's unprofessiona! journalism in this connection is
of the 3 p.m. radio news of 27 April 1994 concerning the second
Anglophone Conference (AACII). An announcement was read to the e
that the AACII scheduled to hold in Bamenda from 29 April to 1 May
been postponed by the convenors. It was purported to have been sig
by Dr Simon Munzu, Dr Carlson Anyangwe and Barrister Sam Ekont
Elad. A claim the three refuted. The AAC spokesman, Dr Simon Mu
prepared a disclaimer for broadcast by CRTV, but this was rejected. C
was even unable to provide Dr Munzu with a copy of the announcemi
alleged to have been signed by him and his colleagues31.
Anglophones are of the consistent impression that CRTV is t
not so much to respond to their aspirations, but rather to stifle initiative
sense of identify in them. The choice to construct the FM transmitter for
South West Province in Douala instead, was criticised by Angloph
interest groups (e.g. SWELA) and by the media, and taken as ano
proof of government's bad faith towards the Anglophones. To some,
Francophone authorities were so concerned with the oil in Limbe that t
feared what might happen if Buea, given the prevailing trend of sentime
among critical Anglophone leaders and public, were to be cut off from
rest of Cameroon and made capital for a seceding West or South
Cameroons. So many people thought that the government wanted to b
control of access to radio technology, to be able to cut off transmisi
should the need arise32.
To Anglophones, it is clear from the content and languagi
programmes, that television is preponderantly for Francophones. Fren
the dominant language and French interests seem not only more impoi
than English interests, but are even superior to Cameroonian concerns
priorities. It is possible and indeed quite regulär that newscasts on C
are shifted (displaced) from their normal time slots in order to make
for the transmission of French football encounters. Hardly has any En
league match been retransmitted in a similar manner, and it is not
that local matches or Cameroon's own international encounters
televised (Atanga 1994).
Thus faced with such resistance, critical Anglophone journalisl
the official media, thanks to the December 1990 communication law,
the English language private newspapers, some of them under pen nai
to insert Anglophone problems, concerns and aspirations on the natii
31 For more, see Cameroon Post, 29 April - l May 1994, p.2.
'2 For more on the FM affair, see The Herald, 3-5 January 1994, p.3; Cameroon Post, 24 Nov
l December 1993, p. 13.
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itical, cultural and economie agendas. Together with their counterparts
' ie critical English language press, the liberation journalists of the official
dia were eager to exposé the contradictions and inconsistencies in the
icies and actions of the Cameroonian leadership. They argued that until
'ernment starled addressing the problems of the Anglophone minority in
imeroon, it will remain an obstacle to the country's economie progress
" socfal justice. They criticised the rigid suppression by government of
nding social forces, especially those of Anglophone origin. They
ie most of Cameroon's current socio-political and economie crises on
lack of accountability of successive Francophone-dominated
'ernments, and present the Anglophone and the rigour and selflessness
blic service in "the good old days" of Southern Cameroons as the
lel. They identified with, and were proud of, the achievements of the
ilo-saxon culture world-wide. In their view, the anglo-saxon culture, "has
sn tested and its validity adequately proven", and all Anglophones must
e advantage of this identity, "rather than seeking to be Francophones
y to wind up ridiculous cultural mulattos to be jeered at and
ronised"33. And in this endeavour, their "heroes" received com-
ndation from the Cameroon Association of English-Speaking Journalists
WIASEJ)34.
However, the rising tides of the politics of belonging, the failure of
Opposition to make a striking difference and the weakening of the
rship of the SCNC, have combined with the arrogance and
idence of those in power, to silence many a journalist that was once
al in CRTV. Many have left and, of those who have stayed on, most
chosen to conform. Once again, the policy of divide-and-rule has
phed, and Anglophoneness has ended the loser.
THE PRINT MEDIA AND ANGLOPHONE IDENfÏTY
If, in the first three years of the current democratie process one
identify a consensus on the Anglophone problem in the Anglophone
this is much less the case today. The increased importance of
lal and ethnic politics has indeed been matched by a redeffnition of
rial policy on the part of some existing papers, or by the creation of
^mouthpieces to take care of ethnic interests. Papers such as The
fc/y Post, The Star Headlines and The Oracle have been created to
on regional issues of interest to the South West Province and
and to define themselves essentially in Opposition to the
oon Post, 27-30 May 1991, p.6.
tleMessager, 28 February 1992, p. 10.




grassfielders (both the "settlers" in the diaspora and those still in their NJ
West and Western Provinces of origin). With the advent of the Gif
SAWA movement, they ha\ e now extended their interests to include
the movement stands for in jeneral. Newer papers such as Elimbi, Mue
The Beacon and Fako International (Mendi me Fako) have been cresf
to attend more specifically to the political ambitions of the SAWA elite in|
Littoral and South West Provinces, and to oppose Grassfields heger
as a matter of policy. Since 1996, little escapes criticism or commenti
this press, including inter-tribal wars in the North West, which it us«
deride the war mongering nature of grassfielders and their penchantl
fighting over land. During elections, the press sought, through the rhe|
of "ethnic cleansing", to solve problems of political representation, ar
encourage a widespread antagonism to "strangers" as parasites
"traitors in the house" (Collectif Changer Ie Cameroun (C3) 1994; Et
Boulaga 1997; Jua 1997). They sought to achieve, through a languag
eihnicity, the necessary level of fear that any kind of mixture with "dut
settlers" will in the end be damaging to the interests of the minority.
As Wang Sonnè (1997: 188-189) notes, the first issue of Elimbi^
26 Maren 1996 coincided with the launching of the SAWA mover
InitiaDy a bi-monthly, Elimbi became a weekly in November 1996, asl
politics of belonging heated up. It described itself as "a regil
newspaper" that targeted the people of the coast, paying attentioij
particuter to the activities and news of the coastal elite. But Elimbfs
striking feature was "the production and dissemination of ideas hostili
the Bamüeke". In February 1997 (eve of the March legislative electie
the proprietor of Elimbi, John Mandengué Epée, a native De
businessman who, a couple of years back, had initiated a libel case j
ended in the imprisonment of Paddy Mbawa of Cameroon Post, launch
monthfy - Muendi, with the mission of further defending SAWA identityj
intensifyingtheanti-Bamileke feeling in Douala.
The grassfielders also used the private press to fight back.
simüar manner, existing papers redefined their editorial focus, while i
ethnic or regional papers sprung up. The Bamileke and North West j
used estabfshed papers, most of which they owned and/or controlle
riposte the attack by the SAWA press, interpreting the January
constitutional changes as an impediment to the democratie process. j
sneer volume of diatribes, commentaries, opinions and reports relate
"autochtonie" and "allogènie" (indigene/settler) in grassfields newsp
such as La Nouvelle Expression, Le Messager, The Post and The
were an indtcatöon of how absorbing the politics of belonging had
since 1996, with equally blatanüy ethnic papers like Ouest Echo and j
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leading the show. Paradoxically, although about belonging, the
aphone problem in Cameroon has become drowned by a press and
iment obsessed with a different kind of belonging35.
CONCLUS1ON
The reactivation of Anglophone identity during the political
alisation process, manifest in the emergence of both the SDF, the first
Dsition party in the country, and several Anglophone organisations and
Ddations, posed a serieus threat to the regime in power and the unitary
ï. Little wonder that the Biya government was keen to neutralise the
|lophone danger and to deconstruct the Anglophone identity which
to unite people in the Anglophone territory across ethnic-regional
indaries based on a common colonial heritage.
In this study we have shown that the regime has been quite
sssful in this endeavour, employing several strategies. One strategy
been the regime's persistent refusal to enter into any meaningful
[jotiations with the Anglophone leadership about either a return to the
3ral state or peaceful secession and its concomitant resórt to outright
ssion of Anglophone movements and actions. Faced with this
srnment strategy, the Anglophone leadership, in turn, has proved
aable of reconsidering its own tactics, clinging instead to its motto: "the
i of argument". As a result, it has dismally failed to deliver the promised
ds. It is now evident that the Anglophone struggles have lost their initial
nentum and that the Anglophone movements are more and more
to inertia and internal schisms. Particularly the Anglophone youth
; increasingly advocated the "argument of force".
Another government strategy has been to establish control over the
media, punishing any journalist who dared to propagate Anglophone
and solidarity, and to tacitly promote the rise and proliferation of
: and regional print media.
Again another government strategy has been to capitalise on the
iing divide between the coastal/forest and grassfields people in the
sphone territory, which is mainly rooted in the increasing resentment of
Westerners about large-scale settlement and economie and political
lation of North Westerners in their region. In the ongoing struggles for
amic and political power during the current political liberalisation
3, South West ethnic-regional identity has been boosted by the 1996
, however, noteworthy that the editorial line of the Francophone Grassfields newspapers, such as
ielle Expression and Le Messager, in respect of the anglophone problem does not essentially
om the government's position.
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constitution, which promised state protection for "autochtonous" minorj
leading to growing resistance of "autochtonous" South Westerners ag|
"dominant and exploitative" North Western "settlers", "strangers", or "J
no-goes" in their region anc various forms of "ethnic cleansing". The reJfcctif changer ie Cameroun (C3J,T9~9~2





Camer?u"édaté- Ya°u"de: JdWons es
.. . ,, ^ , A.,.,. t i- » * ü *• • jpctifChanger Ie Cameroun (C3), and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, eds., 1994
particular the Grand SAWA movement - an alignment of the ethnic-relr - • • • - • • '-' - ë' "
coastal elite in the South West Province and neighbouring Francopn
provinces on the basis of common feelings of exploitation and domin^
by grassfields "settlers". The emergence of the SAWA movement
another devastating effect on the Anglophone identity, the Francoph
Anglophone divide becoming cross-cut by alliances that oppose coi
versus grassfields elites. Of late, however, one may observe certain en
in Sawa solidarity. First, there is a growing feeling among the Littoral
that they have gained less than the South West elite in terms of poBtó^.P-.'?«1Kpn'n8s,P.,.eds.,i993
... r» r-> i i j i-i i i i-i • i- i I» Itineraires daccumulation au Cameroun. Paris: Karthala
nommations. Some Douala leaders, hke Jean-Jacques Ekmdi, have •""
warned the South West elite that 'they do not want to see Bar
domination replaced by South West domination. Second, without the
Westerners to blame or scapegoat since the appointment of Musonc.
PM in September 1996, the South West chiefs and elites are findli
increasingly difficult convincing their peoples to stay committed to Presi
Biya and the CPDM with promises and good intentions alone. This
evident at a joint conference of chiefs and elites in Buea in July 1
where the idea of reviving SWELA was examined with little enthusiasi
support from Gaven Nnoko Mbelle and Martin Nkernngu, its rival sec
generals of the early 1990s36. It is thus possible yet that more and mo|
the disenchanted Anglophone masses would see through the smokes
of divisions of convenience mounted by their elite under the patronagef
monolithic state at odds with multiparty democracy.
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